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Structured Abstract 
 
Purpose 
This paper examines the feasibility of a Common Currency Area (CCA) among 10 (Middle 
East and North Africa) MENA Countries.  The 10 sample countries constitute the six GCC 
Countries and the four Agadir nations.  
 
Methodology Approach  
Macroeconomic data for the 34 year period 1970 to 2003 is used.  Feasibility is examined 
by analyzing the symmetry of response of countries within each group to a common 
external shock.  The impulse response functions (IRF) from a Vector Autoregression Model 
is used. The strength of lingkages within each economic bloc was examined using Pearson 
pairwise correlation and variance decomposition. 
 
Findings 
Among GCC countries, the results show the existence of strong lingkages among the 
monetary variables, signifying strong monetary sector integration.  Such integration 
however is lacking where the real sector is concerned.  Despite the symmetry seen in the 
impulse response functions, variance decomposition showed the absence of any meaningful 
influence of countries on each other within the bloc. Amongst the Agadir nations, the 
results show no correlation in real output growth, some correlation among monetary 
variables but no symmetry whatsoever in response to external shocks.  The variance 
decomposition too did not show mutual influence intra group. 
 
Implications 
The lack of real sector integration  will present a challenge to GCC’s  desired goal of a 
CCA by 2010.    The Agadir nations appear to be simply a loosely knit economic grouping 
with little integration of any kind. Thus, hopes of a CCA among Agadir nations is far too 
premature. 
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Introduction 
 
 As early as 1945, twenty two Arab nations had planned a common currency to be called 
the ‘Arab Dinar’.1  That idea however, did not take root.   For several countries within MENA, 
exchange rate management has largely been a difficult experience.  Their experience has 
generally been one of a fixed peg but incompatible macroeconomic policies causing exchange 
rate misalignment, serious overvaluation, capital flight, balance of payments problems and 
currency crises.  More recently, most MENA countries have made considerable progress in 
liberalization of trade/financial systems and the adoption of pro market monetary policies.  
These have ameliorated to some extent their perennial problems with exchange rates.   Since 
the introduction of a single European currency, the Euro, in January 1999, there has been much 
interest in the area of Optimal and Common Currency areas.  That it has worked relatively well 
over its first five years and is being well accepted has served to further this interest.  The Euro’s 
success aside, a number of external factors have led to renewed interest in Common Currency 
Areas (CCA).  Globalization is one.   As countries and governments grapple with the 
challenges of globalization, the idea of a common currency becomes more palatable. 
Additionally,  the frequency and the depth of recent currency crises have raised the question of 
whether maintaining individual national currencies and the attendant independent policies are 
worth the cost. 
 
 An Optimum Currency Area (OCA) and Common Currency Area (CCA) fall within the 
ambit of currency unions.  An Optimum Currency Area (OCA), using Mundell’s (1961) 
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definition is “a domain within which exchange rates are fixed.”  By this definition, a CCA 
would be a step further with the adoption of a single common currency among members of the 
currency union.  Several structural preconditions have been cited as being necessary for an 
OCA.  Mundell (1961) argues that a high degree of factor mobility is an essential ingredient.  
McKinnon (1963), cites trade intensity or integration as a precondition.  Kennen (1969) would 
examine regional production patterns for product diversification to determine if a region would 
be well suited for  an OCA.  Yet other literature on the configuration needed for a country to be 
a candidate of a currency union identify factors such as, similar levels of inflation, extensive 
trade relationships, similar or synchronous business cycles  and a certain extent of policy 
congruence. 
 The processes that have to be in place and the convergence needed prior to launch of a 
CCA can be a long process.   For Europe, the  Euro’s introduction was the culmination of a 
long evolutionary process towards single currency.  The process itself is more than 50 years old 
and has its origins in the 1957 Treaty of Rome.  The main markers of this evolution would be 
the establishment of the EMS  in 1979, The Single European Act of 1986, the Maastricht treaty, 
1991 and establishment of the European Central Bank (ECB) in 1998.  That the movement 
towards a single European currency has been a long and arduous process should not be lost to 
aspirants of a CCA. 
 
 This paper explores the possibility of a currency union/CCA among two groups of  
MENA countries.  The six GCC countries being the first group and the four Agadir countries, 
the second.  The study is designed to address the following questions; (i) Is a currency union a 
feasible option for these two groups?  (ii)  What would the costs and benefits of such an 
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arrangement be? and  (iii)  How would  existing currency agreements / economic grouping fit 
into this?      The paper is divided into five sections.  Section two below lays out the contending 
issues with regards to implementing a CCA.  Section three describes the  data and 
methodology.  The subsequent Section,  discusses the findings and its implications.  The final 
section, Section 5 concludes with recommendations for policy. 
 
Section 2:   CCA – The Key  Contending Issues 
 
 Much has been researched and written on the impact and efficacy of a CCA  
arrangement on member countries.    Broadly speaking, empirical evidence  appears to show 
three key findings.  First, there appears to be a large positive effect of currency unions on trade.  
Rose (2000), using a gravity model which uses a dummy coefficient to indicate whether 
countries are using the same currency, shows that “bilateral trade between two countries that 
use the same currency is,  controlling for other effects,  200% larger than bilateral trade 
between countries that use different currencies.”2  Other studies of the impact on trade produce 
similar results.  Flandream and Maurel (2001), Lopez Cordova and Meissner (2001) and 
Frankel and Rose (2002)3  all show increased trade of 220%, 100% and 290% respectively as a 
result of currency union.4 
 The  second set of findings come from  studies that examine the effect of reduced 
exchange rate volatility on trade.  In contrast to what one would expect, Degrauwe and 
Skudelny (2000), Frankel and Wei (1992) and Eichengren and Irwin (1995)5 all find the effect 
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of reduced exchange rate volatility on trade to be small.  Finally, the third set of findings is that 
the border effects on trade are large.  It appears that the necessity to use different currencies on 
both sides of a border and the  transaction costs incurred as a result, acts to dampen trade. 
 
 Trade aside, there are other benefits.   One would be the complementary effect of 
increased trade, greater financial integration.  A second,  would be what Eichengreen and 
Hausmann (1999)6, have dubbed as “the original sin”, the inability of a country or its 
corporations to issue or raise debt denominated in its own currency.  This inability has meant 
serious maturity mismatches and extensive exchange rate exposure.  A regional common 
currency would substantially reduce if not eliminate such inadequacies.  The fact that the GCC 
and Agadir nation’s  Central bankers have always been reluctant floaters makes a CCA 
arrangement more amenable.  Yet, the loss of  monetary policy independence especially for 
Agadir nations, would offset some of the attraction.   
 
2.1: Costs and Benefits of  a CCA  
 
 It is obvious that the immense undertaking that a CCA arrangement is, would involve 
numerous benefits and costs.  Many of these would be direct and easily observable while 
others, less so.  Some of the direct benefits would be (i)  the elimination of exchange rate risk 
and greater predictability of relative prices for companies doing business within the CCA (ii)  
reduced transaction costs due to the elimination of bid-ask spreads on currency conversion  and 
the hedging costs that would normally be incurred.  (iii) the trade benefits of faster growth, 
                                                           
 
6
 See:  Bergsten and Park (2002) 
 7
enhanced competitiveness and efficiency (iv)  enhanced cross-border investments and factor 
reallocation and (v) a final direct benefit comes from the ‘enforced’ policy commitment.   
 
Though many of the benefits of a CCA could also accrue to normal fixed exchange rate 
/ pegged systems,   history has shown that fixed exchange rates are not irrevocably fixed.    
Since a CCA arrangement is much more encompassing in terms of policy commitment and has 
deeper roots, the cost of breaking it is much higher than breaking a fixed exchange rate.  This 
gives the CCA the credibility that a pegged system lacks. The result would be  that a common 
currency would be less susceptible to monetary disturbance and speculative bubbles.    Finally, 
since policy making, especially those of a monetary nature are detached and independent of 
individual governments, central banks and monetary authorities would be subject to less 
political pressure thereby leading to money supply and price stability.  The fact that Europe has 
had less than 2% inflation over the last 10 years is no accident. 
  
The costs of a CCA  are as varied as its benefits.  The most obvious cost is the loss of 
domestic monetary policy flexibility.  In many developing economies,  monetary policy is 
heavily relied upon as an instrument for stabilization of the domestic economy.  Having a 
common, region wide monetary policy would mean that an individual country faced with an 
asymmetric shock cannot respond on its own.    Membership in a CCA would often mean that 
complying with the requirements of the currency agreement would take precedence over 
domestic needs.  Thus, external compliance dictates domestic policy.  Finally, for any currency 
arrangement to work,  extensive policy coordination and significant commitment is needed to 
ensure compliance.  This can be a costly requirement since getting cooperation on a number of 
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usually conflicting issues is inherently difficult.  For example, getting a consensus on how to 
divide seignorage revenues among members would be   one such issue.  Opening up borders to 
comply with labor mobility is another very sensitive issue.  
 
2.2: Existing Currency/Economic  Arrangements 
  
 In this section we examine the existing currency arrangements among our sample 
MENA Countries.  Going by formal arrangements, there are really two subsets within our 10 
sample countries.  The four Agadir countries – Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan and the six 
GCC countries, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain and the UAE. 
 
 As early as 1945 while the US, Britain and the allied  Nations were working out the 
Bretton Woods System, twenty two Arab nations got together to initiate a “Common Currency” 
called “Arab Dinar”.7  Despite the early start, there appears to have been little progress until 
about 50+ years later when the GCC heads of state pushed for a fixed timetable for currency 
union among their six countries.  Based on this plan, a common currency area could be in place 
among the six GCC nations by 2010 – i.e. some 65 years after the idea of an Arab common 
currency was first mooted.  That a more broad based arrangement involving more than the six 
GCC  countries has proved elusive, is testimony to the difficulties involved in managing the 
tradeoffs and the reality of economic disparities among the  MENA countries.  The fact that the 
MENA region has witnessed a series of wars since 1945 and is generally seen as one that is 
highly unstable has not helped.  In such an environment, it is obvious that pushing for regional 
                                                           
 
7
 See – Bassem Kamar, (2004) 
 9
economic cooperation may have to be relegated to meet more pressing political crises.  Yet, 
even here, a CCA arrangement could be a source of economic stability by ensuring policy 
credibility and cohesion. 
 
 Comparing the two subsets, the Agadir and GCC countries, one is quickly convinced of  
the stark contrast between these two groupings.  The older of the two, the GCC was formally 
established in 1981, largely on the initiative of Saudi Arabia, the groups largest member both 
by population and economic size.  The exchange rate arrangement for the block is outlined 
within Article 22 of the Council’s Unified Economic Agreement of June 1982.8  Article 22, 
clearly states the objective of creating a common currency among the six member states by 
2010.  The one common economic feature that no links all 6 countries, is the fact that everyone 
of these countries is oil rich and heavily dependent on oil exports.  In terms of economic wealth 
and per capita GDP, these six nations are clearly apart from the other Arab / MENA nations. 
 
 The four Agadir nations on the other hand cannot be more different.  Whereas average 
per capita GDP for the six GCC countries was US$16,203 in 2004, that of  the Agadir nations 
was US$1,849.  Aside from difference in  per capita income and wealth, none of the Agadir 
nations have meaningful reserves of oil.  They rely heavily on tourism and remittances from 
their citizens abroad as the main source of foreign exchange earnings.  Thus, while oil price 
change alone dictates economic performance within GCC, the Agadir nations like most non-
OPEC nations are reliant on global economic conditions.  However, unlike other countries, 
given their reliance on tourism, these four countries have taken the brunt of the surge in 
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international terrorist activities.  Economic differences aside, Agadir itself is a much newer 
grouping relative to the GCC.  The Agadir Agreement, which formally established the group 
took place as recently as February 2004.  The immediate aim of the grouping is the creation of 
a free-trade area (FTA) among the four countries by 2005. 
 
2.3: Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
 As with many  MENA countries, exchange rate evolution in the Agadir countries have 
been one of  fixed/managed systems, followed by serious overvaluation which in turn leads to 
crisis and devaluation followed by some liberalization.  Egypt is a case in point.  Though in 
1991 as part of an IMF initiated reform program, Egypt had announced the adoption of a 
“managed float” for the Egyptian pound, the pound was essentially on a “conventional fixed 
peg” to the US$.9  Following an overvaluation, serious current account deficit and balance of 
payments problems, and the attendant capital flight, the Egyptian government in January 2001, 
announced a devaluation of the pound and the adoption of a crawling peg against the US$.  
Deteriorating economic conditions following the September 11, terrorist attacks, placed 
additional pressure.  In January 2003, the government announced a “free float” of the pound.  
Over the next few months, the pound depreciated sharply by about 33% against the US$. 
 
 The Jordanian Dinar appears to have gone through a similar pattern.  Following a series 
of shocks due to overvaluation, the dinar was devalued 12% against the US$ and put on a 
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“managed float”.  However, the dinar was subject to further deterioration and depreciation.  
This led to a formal fixed peg of the dinar to the US$ in October 1995.  The Moroccan dirham, 
previously  on a fixed peg to the French franc was delinked in 1973.  The following period 
witnessed Morocco’s experimentation with managed floats.  The dirham’s exchange rate being 
managed based on a basket of currencies.  As has been the case of it neighbours, the Moroccan 
dirham witnessed significant deviations in the RER leading to Balance of Payments (BOP) 
problems.  Recent years have seen sharp increases in the country’s trade deficit, implying 
overvaluation and increasing the dirham’s vulnerability. 
 
 The Tunisian dinar, like the Moroccan dirham, had its links to the French franc 
eliminated in the mid 1970s.  In 1978, the dinar was linked to a basket of currencies which 
included the US$.  Balance of  Payments problems in subsequent years forced the Central Bank 
to begin depreciating the dinar – something that went on until 1989.  Reforms and liberalization 
were undertaken in 1992 and extended further in 1994.  Though Tunisia has had its share of 
BOP problems, it appears to have avoided much of the exchange rate shocks. 
 
 Unlike the Agadir nations, the GCC countries as mentioned earlier have been working 
towards a common currency by 2010.  This goal is to be reached by having a customs union 
and an integration of exchange rates by 2003 and an agreement on ‘convergence criteria’  by 
200510.   In order to ensure stable cross rates, the exchange rate integration required member 
currencies to be officially pegged to the US$.  That the US$ was chosen as the “anchor” 
currency is not surprising given the fact that GCC currencies have been on a fixed peg to the 
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US$  for a long time.  Five of the six GCC currencies have been pegged to the US$.  The 
exception being the Kuwaiti dinar, which was linked to a basket of currencies.  Still, the US$ 
was prominently weighted within that basket.  While the Omani and Saudi riyals have been 
pegged to the dollar since the 1970s and mid 1980s respectively, the Qatari, Bahraini and UAE 
currencies have been formally pegged to the US$.  The idea of ensuring regional exchange rate 
stability by fixing regional currencies to a common anchor currency is built on the template of 
the European Monetary System (EMS), where a central grid was established by fixing member 
currencies to the ECU (European Currency Unit).  As part of the move towards a Common 
Currency Area, the GCC countries have agreed on commitments prohibiting any unilateral 
changes to the pegged rate between their individual currencies and the US$.  Attempts are 
currently under way on convergence by harmonizing growth rates, inflation / interest rates, and 
monetary and fiscal policies 
 
Section 3: Data and Methodology 
  
 Since symmetry of economic activity has been identified as a key criterion in 
determining the feasibility of a CCA, our analysis is built on identifying “compatibility” among 
our two sample groups of  countries.  Since compatibility would imply some degree of 
synchronicity among key macroeconomic variables, we examine macroeconomic data.  
Specifically, we examine annual data on real GDP growth, inflation11, money growth and short-
term interest rates12 across the 10  countries over the 34 year period 1970– 2003.  Our choice of 
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these variables, has to do with the fact that aside from synchronous business cycles, similar 
levels of inflation and a degree of policy congruence have been cited as necessary 
preconditions in previous literature.   The data has been sourced largely from the United 
Nations Statistics division database13 and IFS (International Financial Statistics)14.  The 10  
countries examined are the six GCC countries and the four Agadir nations. 
 
 In identifying compatibility, we use three analytical techniques.  First, we carry out a 
series of correlation analysis for each variable across the sample countries.  The Pearson 
Pairwise correlation statistic is used to check for statistical significance.  The second analytical 
technique used is Vector Autoregression or VAR analysis.  Both impulse response and variance 
decomposition is used to examine interrelationships amongst real GDP growth rates15 of the 
sample countries. 
 
3.1 : The Vector Autoregression Model 
  
 The correlation analysis helps identify links among macroeconomic variables across 
countries.  While such correlation does point out links among variables, they do not show 
important interrelationships among the variables.  Neither does correlation imply similarity in 
response to external shocks. 
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 Since a CCA arrangement implies common policies, potential candidates would be 
countries that respond in a similar way to external shocks.  Such logic to identify countries for a 
currency union was first used by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993)16.  They use a variant of the 
VAR (Vector Autoregression) methodology proposed by Blanchard and Quah (1989).  Since 
then, the technique has been used extensively in OCA/CCA related research. 
 
 In identifying potential candidates among our sample countries we examine the 
interrelationship among their real GDP growth rates. In particular, we examine the symmetry in 
each countries response to external shocks.  The impulse (shock) variable is the World Real 
GDP.  Countries that respond in a similar fashion to shocks in World GDP would be potential 
candidates17.  A multivariate,  Unrestricted  Vector Autoregression Model is used on annual 
real GDP of  our sample countries.  In its standardized form, a VAR model is: 
tttt ezayaay 111211110 +++= −− ……………………..(1) 
tttt ezayaaz 212212120 +++= −− ……………………...(2) 
 
where te1  and te2  are stochastic error terms called impulses or shocks in the language of VAR.  
Both error terms have zero means, constant variances and are individually serially uncorrelated.  
The structure of  the system incorporates feedback because ty  and tZ  are allowed to affect 
each other.  In Eq. (1), current and past values of (y), affect the time path of (z).  Eq. (2) allows 
for feedback between current and past values of (z) and (y).  VAR essentially allows all 
variables to interact linearly with their own and each others current and past values.  Thus, 
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using historical data, one can determine the quantitative impact that each variable has on its 
own future value and the future values of the other variable(s). 
  
 Equations (1) and (2) above outlined a bivariate VAR model.  A Multivariate 
generalization of VAR can be shown as follows: 
tptpttt exAxAxAAx +++++= −−− ....22110 ……….(3) 
 
where: 
 
tx  =  an (n . 1) vector containing each of the n variables included in the VAR 
0A  =  an (n . 1) vector of intercept items 
tA  =  (n .n) matrices of coefficients 
te  =  an (n . 1) vector or error terms 
 
It is useful to keep in mind that the objective here, and that of VAR analysis in general is to 
determine the interrelationships among the variables and not, forecasting nor parameter 
estimates.  Thus, one could construct an n-equation VAR with each equation containing a fixed 
number of lags18 of all n variables in the system.  An n-equation VAR is typically; 
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where: 
 
t1χ  =  % Real GDP growth for country 1, in period t 
0iA  =  the parameters representing intercept terms 
)(LA ji =  the polynomials in the lag operator L 
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The individual coefficients of )(LA ji  are denoted by ).().......2(),1( naaa jijiji   The variables 
being quarterly real GDP growth % for each small  country. 
 
Note:  Since all equations have the same lag, the polynomials )(LA ji  are all   of the same 
degree.  The terms, te1  are white-noise disturbances. 
 
 
Section 4: Results and Analysis 
 
 Recall that our analysis involved three analytical techniques,  Pearson Pairwise 
Correlation, Impulse response and Variance decomposition.  We begin our analysis with results 
of the Pearson pairwise correlation.  Tables 1 thru 4 in appendix show the results of the 
correlation analysis.  Table 1 shows the correlation in the real GDP growth rate of the GCC and 
Agadir nations.  The later three tables show the correlation in annual inflation rates, Money 
Growth and 3 month Deposit rates for the 34 year period 1970 – 2003.  While the correlation in 
real GDP would indicate the strength of the linkage among these countries in the real sector, 
the latter three tables capture the linkage in the financial sector. 
 
 For countries with clear aspiration to forming regional economic blocs, as Table 1 
shows, there appears to be little correlation in growth rates.  Among the GCC countries, we see 
only two meaningful linkages, between UAE and Bahrain and Saudi/Qatar.  Among the Agadir 
countries there is not a single significant correlation in real output growth.  If there is little 
linkage amongst the countries where real output is concerned, the picture is very different,  
especially for the GCC countries, where financial sector variables are concerned.  Table 2 
shows the correlation in inflation rates.  Notice the numerous significant relationships.  Even 
among the Agadir countries we see a few significant correlations, particularly in the case of 
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Tunisia.  The correlation in Money Growth shown in Table 3, is even stronger.  Among the 
GCC countries, just about every correlation in Money growth is significant.  Money growth 
amongst the GCC countries obviously appears to be moving together.  For the Agadir countries 
we again see some sporadic links but for different pairs.  Jordan / Egypt appears to be the one 
common pair with significant links in both Tables 2 and 3.  The final table shows the 
correlation in nominal interest rates.  The annualized 3 month deposit  rate, which had the best 
reporting frequency was taken as representative of nominal interest rates.19   As with the earlier 
monetary variables, we see generally strong correlation among the GCC countries.  For the 
Agadir nations, correlation in deposit rates shows the most number of significant relationships. 
  
 So, what can we conclude from these?  For the GCC countries, there obviously are 
much stronger links where monetary variables are concerned.  The monetary sectors are well 
integrated – obviously the result of the monetary coordination and convergence criteria.  These 
strong link however still appears to be missing where the real sector is concerned.  While 
monetary integration is strong, trade integration still appears minimal.  Thus, the link in real 
output growth is tenous at best.  The Agadir countries too show the same lack of trade 
integration and links in real output growth.  While we see better linkage in the monetary 
variables, they are not consistent.  A different set of paired countries show significance for 
different variables. 
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4.1: VAR Analysis; Impulse Response Functions 
 
 The Vector Autoregression Model shown as Eq. (4) was estimated for the two sets of 
countries.  Using the estimated model, the impulse response functions and variance 
decomposition is examined using the natural log of Real GDP for WORLD and the 10 sample 
countries.  Thus, two sets of VAR Analysis was carried out.  The first with WORLD real GDP 
growth and GCC countries followed by another with WORLD Real GDP with that of the 
Agadir countries.  The number of lags in the VAR is set to two lags.  Since the ordering of 
variables is important, the ordering is done by ranking the countries by their GDP size.  For 
both  sets of analysis, the impulse response of individual countries is examined by “shocking” 
the WORLD Real GDP variable.  As mentioned earlier, the objective is to examine how each 
country’s  real output responds to the same external shock.  Symmetry, or countries with a 
similar response would suitable candidates  for a common currency area. 
 
 Figure 1, shows the response of each of the six GCC countries real GDP growth over 10 
periods to innovations (shocks) in WORLD real GDP growth.  Four of the six countries, Saudi, 
Kuwait, Qatar and Oman have similar / symmetrical initial response.  All four react negatively 
over the first period.  Output growth then stabilizes for the first three countries, while Oman 
shows a slight increase from period 2 before converging back to the original level.  Bahrain 
shows a response similar to that of Oman, though the initial negative impact is hardly visible.  
The one non-symmetric response is that of UAE.  The initial period response to the shock is 
positive.  UAE’s non symmetry is perhaps a reflection of its greater dependence on services 
and relatively lower reliance on oil exports alone.  Thus, with the exception of the UAE, one 
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could make the case that the first year (first period) impulse response are largely symmetric for 
the 5 GCC countries. 
 
 Figure 2 shows the impulse response functions for the four Agadir countries.  What is 
obvious is that unlike the case of the GCC countries, there is no symmetry whatsoever in this 
case.  While there appears to be some resemblance in the response of  Egypt and Jordan, they 
are really quite different in magnitude and duration.  Thus, it appears that none of the Agadir 
countries respond similarly / symmetrically to the same external shock. 
 
4.2: Variance Decomposition 
  
 Summary results of the variance decomposition for the two sets of countries, for four 
variance periods are shown in Tables 5 and 6.  In the context of our analysis, variance 
decomposition tells us the extent to which variance in the real output growth of each country is 
influenced by shocks to the common factor, WORLD GDP and by each of the other countries’ 
real output.  Examining the variance decomposition of the GCC countries in Table 6, it is clear 
that none of the countries within the GCC have substantive influence on each other.  The only 
case where we see some influence is in the case of Bahrain,   both Saudi and the UAE  appear 
to have some influence.  In all other cases, no GCC member countries appears to have 
influence on real output growth in another.  Not surprisingly, we see similar results for Agadir 
countries in Table 5.  The exception appears to be Jordan, where Tunisia has quite a substantive 
influence. 
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Section 5: Conclusion 
 
 This paper examined the feasibility of a CCA within two subsets of MENA countries, 
the GCC and Agadir group of countries.  Feasibility is examined by analyzing the symmetry of 
response of countries within each group to a common external shock.  In addition, the strength 
of linkages within each economic bloc was examined using Pearson pairwise correlation and 
variance decomposition. 
 
 Among the GCC countries, the results show the existence of strong linkages among the 
monetary variables, signifying strong monetary sector  integration.  Such integration however is 
lacking where the real sectors are concerned.  Real sector integration is tenous at best.  With the 
exception of UAE, the GCC countries have broadly symmetrical response to a common 
external shock.  Despite the symmetry seen in the impulse response functions (IRF), Variance 
decomposition (VD), showed the absence of any meaningful influence of countries on each 
other within the bloc.  At first glance these results may seem contradictory.  In reality, the 
results are congruent and interesting.  The board symmetry seen in the IRF results tells us that 
these countries have a common reaction to an external shock but the variance decomposition 
shows little integration amongst themselves.20  In other words, from a real GDP growth 
viewpoint, they are “independent” of each other but are connected / plugged in a similar way to 
global economic conditions.  The fact that the GCC countries are all uniformly oil exporters to 
the rest of the world, but produce little non-oil products that are differentiated from each others, 
                                                           
 
 
 
20
 Since the variance decomposition is based on Real GDP growth, the lack of influence here implies lack of  integration in the 
real sector. 
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explains the results.  Being producers of similar non-oil products, there simply isn’t much 
avenue for intra-regional trade.  Thus, the lack of influence of each country’s shocks on other 
members.  In a sense, the variance decomposition results reinforce our findings from the 
correlation analysis, which showed minimal linkage in the real sector.  The lack of trade 
intensity or integration amongst GCC countries will represent a challenge to the desired 
implementation of a CCA by 2010. 
 
 Amongst the Agadir countries, we see no correlation in real output growth, some 
correlation where monetary variables are concerned, but no symmetry whatsoever in response 
to external shocks.  The variance decomposition too did not show much mutual influence 
amongst countries within the group, where real GDP growth was concerned. 
 
5.1: Implications 
 
 So what do these results imply about the potential for a CCA within the two groups of 
countries?  The first implication of the results is that Monetary integration is much easier to 
achieve than trade / real sector integration.  Yet, if the ultimate objective of a CCA is enhanced 
economic prosperity over the long term, then much needs to be done, even for the GCC which 
is now well advanced into  a customs union.  Where effort needs to be focused is on increasing 
intra regional trade.  Intra-regional trade  within GCC was a mere 3.5% in 1996.21  The 
similarity in output appears to be the key deterrent.  Thus, product diversification is necessary.  
The reason increased regional trade is so critical to the long term success of a CCA is the fact 
                                                           
 
21
 See Jasser & Hamidy – BIS Papers 2004.  Table 3 pp 120 
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that trade serves to synchronize business cycles; which in turn makes it possible for the use of 
common policies.  In the absence of trade integration, the formation of a CCA would not only 
be hollow but also problematic.  That  a CCA will enable the use of common intra bloc policies 
independent of extra-regional influences will be meaningless and ineffectual if oil prices alone 
continue to dictate growth. 
 
 So, based on the results, one can only conclude that the GCC as it now stands is at best 
a quasi-monetary bloc with little real sector integration.  The Agadir nations on the other hand 
appear to be simply a loosely knit economic grouping with little integration of any kind.  For 
the Agadir nations, a CCA is neither a feasible nor a sensible aspiration for now.  Their more 
urgent need aside from enhancing intra-regional trading would be to break away from the 
vicious cycle of exchange rate deviation, BOP problems and devaluations.  Linking their 
currencies to a trade-weighted basket of currencies and adopting managed floats with broader 
bands would be sensible.  The key to success would still be policy consistency.  Domestic 
policies, especially monetary ones must be congruent with exchange rate policies if further 
crises are to be avoided. 
 
 While a CCA is certainly feasible for the GCC, a number of initiatives will have to be 
undertaken prior to the intended implementation in 2010.  For starters, the adoption of a well 
coordinated industrial policy within the group would be needed.  The template used among 
ASEAN countries or the Korean experience in this regards, would be useful.  Such an industrial 
policy could enable specialization within individual countries enabling them to reap economies 
of scale, have a diversified industrial structure within the group and enhanced regional trade 
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and competitiveness.  Additionally, as the Asian currency crisis of 1997 / 98 showed, even a 
strong industrial structure is no guarantee against a currency crisis if domestic financial 
institutions are weak and vulnerable.  Thus, strengthening the financial sector within the GCC 
would certainly be a required initiative.  Finally the need for a Common Central bank and 
coordinating institution will need to be worked out.  In this regard, experience in Europe has 
shown that a key sticking point will be the issue of how seigniorage which is lost by the 
individual country central banks, will be shared. 
 
 Much of the issues surrounding a CCA have serious economic implications.  Since they 
typically also involve sovereignty and autonomy, may of the needed decisions are political in 
nature.  Thus, political will and commitment will dictate the progress made towards a CCA. 
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TABLE  1: Pearson PAIRWISE Correlation of Annual  Real GDP growth rate (1970 – 2003) 
  BAHRAIN KUWAIT OMAN QATAR SAUDI UAE  EGYPT JORDAN MOROCCO TUNISIA 
BAHRAIN  1 .002 .157 -.252 .186 .754(**)      
KUWAIT   1 -.099 .207 -.062 -.172      
OMAN     1 -.387(*) -.210 -.016      
QATAR       1 .407(*) -.186      
SAUDI         1 .212      
UAE           1      
       
 
    
EGYPT              1 .190 .203 -.022 
JORDAN                1 -.074 .212 
MOROCCO                  1 -.088 
TUNISIA                    1 
          
   
TABLE  2: Pearson PAIRWISE Correlation of ANNUAL INFLATION RATE (1970 – 2003) 
  BAHRAIN KUWAIT OMAN QATAR SAUDI UAE  EGYPT JORDAN MOROCCO TUNISIA 
BAHRAIN 1 .444(**) .893(**) .814(**) .296 .847(**)      
KUWAIT   1 .427(*) .513(**) .146 .441(*)      
OMAN     1 .822(**) .237 .875(**)      
QATAR       1 .550(**) .894(**)      
SAUDI         1 .593(**)      
UAE           1      
       
 
    
EGYPT              1 .347(*) .003 -.136 
JORDAN                1 .240 .364(*) 
MOROCCO                  1 .513(**) 
TUNISIA                    1 
                     
TABLE 3: Pearson PAIRWISE Correlation of  MONEY GROWTH RATE (Annualised) (1970 – 2003) 
  BAHRAIN KUWAIT OMAN QATAR SAUDI UAE  EGYPT JORDAN MOROCCO TUNISIA 
BAHRAIN 1 .646(**) .316 .653(**) .591(**) .669(**)      
KUWAIT   1 .464(**) .708(**) .676(**) .547(**)      
OMAN     1 .504(**) .594(**) .707(**)      
QATAR       1 .701(**) .671(**)      
SAUDI         1 .786(**)      
UAE           1      
EGYPT              1 .534(**) .129 .359(*) 
JORDAN                1 .361(*) .275 
MOROCCO                  1 .136 
TUNISIA                    1 
              
 **Significant at 1%, *Sign. At 5% (2 tail) 
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TABLE  4: Pearson PAIRWISE Correlation of Annualised 3-Month Deposit Rate (1990 – 2003) 
  BAHRAIN KUWAIT OMAN QATAR SAUDI UAE  EGYPT JORDAN MOROCCO TUNISIA 
 
BAHRAIN 1 .529 .841(**) .654 .962(**) na 
 
    
KUWAIT   1 .652(*) -.591 .603(*) na      
OMAN     1 .836(**) .901(**) na      
QATAR       1 .727(*) na      
SAUDI         1 na      
UAE           na      
       
 
    
EGYPT              1 .444 .864(**) .952(**) 
JORDAN                1 .863(**) .434 
MOROCCO                  1 .885(**) 
TUNISIA                    1 
              
 **Significant at 1%, *Sign. At 5% (2 tail) 
                The deposit rate for UAE was not reported. 
                 
Table 5 :  Summary Variance Decomposition for Agadir Countries 
Variance Decomposition of EGYPT 
Period WORLD EGYPT  MOROCCO TUNISIA JORDAN 
1 8.498585 91.50141  0 0 0 
2 14.46368 84.92905  0.143796 0.224489 0.23899 
3 16.81722 80.5944  0.113716 2.170081 0.304583 
4 15.89762 73.08821  0.122264 9.706139 1.185763 
 
Variance Decomposition of MOROCCO 
Period WORLD EGYPT  MOROCCO TUNISIA JORDAN 
1 9.680202 3.283813  87.03599 0 0 
2 9.434794 17.52521  66.71992 4.273117 2.046953 
3 8.332262 24.80771  59.74829 3.909723 3.202017 
4 8.224674 30.43176  54.67659 3.548645 3.118334 
 
Variance Decomposition of TUNISIA 
Period WORLD EGYPT  MOROCCO TUNISIA JORDAN 
1 8.653372 0.138922  6.360952 84.84675 0 
2 14.36632 3.300116  5.7136 75.97643 0.64353 
3 26.10375 3.839119  4.790295 64.74123 0.525601 
4 36.44583 5.170968  4.031611 53.93412 0.417466 
 
Variance Decomposition of JORDAN 
Period WORLD EGYPT  MOROCCO TUNISIA JORDAN 
1 2.009429 1.472138  0.224462 38.76739 57.52658 
2 16.17593 1.306413  1.877081 42.1918 38.44878 
3 31.29028 0.878467  4.750394 38.25216 24.8287 
4 39.52426 1.228158  5.148682 34.33942 19.75948 
Cholesky Ordering :  WORLD EGYPT MOROCCO TUNISIA JORDAN 
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Table 6:  Summary Variance Decomposition for GCC Countries 
 
Variance Decomposition of SAUDI 
Period WORLD SAUDI UAE KUWAIT OMAN QATAR BAHRAIN 
1 12.47979 87.52021 0 0 0 0 0 
2 6.076307 84.53732 0.447243 2.989752 2.034974 2.015695 1.898709 
3 3.725875 71.96816 1.213862 8.594707 7.866511 2.327589 4.303297 
4 2.927661 66.88695 0.83747 10.79872 12.03264 2.156996 4.359569 
 
Variance Decomposition of UAE 
Period WORLD SAUDI UAE KUWAIT OMAN QATAR BAHRAIN 
1 2.429892 0.11306 97.45705 0 0 0 0 
2 13.75928 7.480311 56.70856 0.475452 12.43952 1.780277 7.356602 
3 15.36534 13.4367 38.70242 1.335296 15.85232 6.734094 8.573834 
4 13.5585 15.60388 33.0318 6.270794 16.4297 7.784165 7.321147 
 
Variance Decomposition of KUWAIT 
Period WORLD SAUDI UAE KUWAIT OMAN QATAR BAHRAIN 
1 6.023569 0.005468 0.920022 93.05094 0 0 0 
2 4.102145 10.79395 0.605569 80.50695 0.333982 1.034055 2.623347 
3 3.315565 21.59206 0.917172 66.98772 2.360788 1.352064 3.474624 
4 3.004656 23.26601 2.81302 60.07733 5.100481 2.269762 3.468744 
 
Variance Decomposition of OMAN 
Period WORLD SAUDI UAE KUWAIT OMAN QATAR BAHRAIN 
1 1.667385 9.541582 0.871252 0.091545 87.82824 0 0 
2 0.699591 18.97315 12.04916 0.840893 64.92939 2.503292 0.004526 
3 1.489683 21.44272 12.64169 4.582569 55.1932 2.17985 2.470294 
4 2.044152 23.35084 10.32242 7.789834 50.80967 2.006895 3.676185 
 
Variance Decomposition of QATAR 
Period WORLD SAUDI UAE KUWAIT OMAN QATAR BAHRAIN 
1 45.7669 0.045977 7.636383 5.065843 0.171712 41.31319 0 
2 37.03303 0.577504 22.06048 4.474731 1.480359 34.11913 0.254759 
3 28.59413 0.399275 15.74838 12.45074 4.921254 26.32854 11.55769 
4 23.31756 6.21931 11.76988 18.86973 3.7379 22.52817 13.55745 
        
 
Variance Decomposition of BAHRAIN 
Period WORLD SAUDI UAE KUWAIT OMAN QATAR BAHRAIN 
1 7.067959 19.77848 15.60517 8.917434 5.120488 3.763905 39.74657 
2 5.067457 41.47293 14.24316 10.90454 10.31964 1.695561 16.29671 
3 9.419977 46.40637 10.88246 11.12957 8.679723 1.266995 12.21491 
4 10.15307 47.13252 9.406783 12.32143 9.046836 1.263565 10.67579 
Cholesky Ordering:  WORLD SAUDI UAE KUWAIT OMAN QATAR BAHRAIN 
 
 
